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Prisoners of the Media:  
Television in Russia since the Collapse of Communism
Jeffrey Brassard
In 1991 one of the most oppressive regimes in history collapsed and millions 
of people were set free. Following the implementation of glasnost and per-
estroika Soviet communism proved untenable and was consigned to the trash 
heap of history. The Soviet media itself played a tremendous role in facilitat-
ing the collapse. After Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev removed censor-
ship from the Soviet press they began looking into the past transgressions of 
their nation and reported it aggressively. As a result, the Soviet state and its 
Russian successor became a much weaker power agent and other agents of 
power appeared to challenge the power of the state with regards to the media. 
Television, as the most important medium in Russian society, came to be a 
special case. The power relations in Russian television are essentially a his-
torical map of power relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Power 
in Russian media is made up of a complex set of relationships that is worth 
exploring.
Russia’s media went through an enormous transition following the col-
lapse of communism. To understand Russia’s place in the world today it is 
important to understand the power relations that have shaped it. Julia Ra-
zanova (2007) argues that:
The change in the media systems in all post-Communist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe is part of a larger process of systemic social transformation, con-
nected to changes of a society’s economic system, political regime, social con-
sciousness, political culture and the public view of the media. (p. 133)
The change in the structure of media systems shapes the changes in 
power structures in post-communist nations, but also has a role in shaping the 
direction of these changes. According to research conducted by Sarah Oates 
and Stephen White (2003) by 1991 ninety-two percent of Russian households 
had at least one television (p. 1). Their research indicates a large discrepancy 
between the number of Russians that read daily newspapers and the number 
of Russians that watch television news. Of the 2000 Russians interviewed in 
their survey seventy-seven percent watch nightly national news programs, 
while only seventeen percent read a national newspaper daily. Thus, it makes 
sense to examine the Russian television system in order to understand the 
media system in Russia.
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The focus of most analysis of Russian television has been on news mak-
ing. This area seems to be the most fruitful for the analysis of power rela-
tions. The fact that Russian news media has been the primary area of analysis 
does not, however, mean that the entertainment media in Russia is not also 
part of a national identity project. The analysis has simply tended to gravitate 
towards the more serious public discourses represented by television news. 
The Russian media environment, like Russian society itself can be charac-
terized by its instability. As such, to gain an understanding of current power 
relations it is necessary to trace the power relations as they emerged and 
changed through the 1990s and into the early part of the 2000s.
There are many agents of power that play a role in the production of 
television news in Russia. The most powerful of these agents are the Russian 
State and the owners of television channels. The Russian state is the most im-
portant agent of power. Olessia Koltsova (2006) cautions, however, that the 
power of the Russian state is difficult to describe. She claims that “even in 
the most stable and well structured societies the State never forms an ideally 
consolidated group smoothly directing all its actions to the same goal... Any 
modern state is a complex institution that embraces multiple organizations” 
(p. 46). The Russian State’s power over the media comes from a number of 
practices. The first is the granting of broadcast licenses. Koltsova (2006) 
argues that “the State... owns the majority of the means of communication, 
including most radio and TV signal transmitting networks” (p. 51). Thus 
the state, by controlling what can be broadcast, is able to exercise influence 
over the content that is produced either by granting or by revoking broadcast 
licenses. An example can be seen in the story of Peterburg Kanal 5. This once 
popular, national television station fell out of favor with the State and, as 
such, had its broadcast license revoked. It was very quickly replaced by NTV, 
a channel run by an ally of Boris Yeltsin. 
The State also has the ability to both create and enforce laws and regula-
tions. This is particularly important in the Russian case because of the Rus-
sian State’s alternatively loose and severe enforcement of the rules. Follow-
ing the collapse of the Soviet Union the laws of the Soviet state regarding 
media had to be dismantled. Koltsova (2006) argues that the system that took 
its place was characterized by “superfluity [meaning] that all the relevant 
rules taken together turn out to be entirely or almost unobservable,” further 
commenting that current Russian media law “automatically makes any rel-
evant actor an offender: obeying one norm, s/he inevitably breaks another” 
(p. 54). As both the rule maker and the only body that has access to legitimate 
uses of violence, the State can produce virtually whatever results they wish.
A third, though not insignificant way that the State is able to exercise 
power is through the use of public funds. This is particularly important in the 
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Russian case because all television broadcasters were in some way reliant 
on the state for some type of funding. There are two general strategies that 
may be used, either direct-funding as in the case of both national state owned 
television networks (ORT and RTR) or, as in the case of the privately owned 
NTV, support may be given through the use of tax breaks or state backed 
loans (Koltsova, 2006, p. 194). 
The second most influential group is made up of those who own the me-
dia. Koltsova (2006) divides media ownership into two categories: internal 
and external (pp. 73–85). Internal ownership, according to Koltsova, means 
that the owners expect their media outlet to be profitable and that they antici-
pate that it will be self sustaining. External ownership implies that owners do 
not expect the media holdings to be profitable and are willing to pump large 
amounts of money into them. According to Koltsova (2001), the three na-
tional Russian channels, ORT, NTV, and RTR, are externally owned (p. 322). 
The typical owners of Russian media holdings have been the “oligarchs” 
such as Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gussinsky (Koltsova, 2006, p. 77). 
The “oligarchs” are the group that was able to amass great fortunes from the 
privatization of Russian state property following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Koltsova (2006) suggests that the oligarchs “see media first of all as 
weapons to gain political capital—a vital resource that later can be converted 
into all other forms of capital outside the media domain” (p. 77). 
The history of the Russian media since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
can be split into two broad phases. The first phase took place roughly be-
tween 1991 and 2000 and was remarkable for the relative freedoms that 
the media enjoyed. The second is the period beginning with the election of 
Vladimir Putin as president of the Russian Federation in 2000 and continu-
ing to the present. This second phase is characterized by the reassertion of the 
Russian state’s influence over the media. Both phases represent a different 
idea of what Russia should become and serve the interests of very different 
groups.
The first historical phase mentioned (1991–1999) can generally be 
understood as a very chaotic period during which there were a very large 
number of players involved in the production of television news. The power 
relations that were in play during this period were perhaps the most evident 
during national election periods in 1993, 1995, 1996, 1999, and 2000. Rus-
sian elections can be divided into two groups: elections of the Russian parlia-
ment, called the Duma, and presidential elections. Duma elections are held 
first and a few months later the presidential elections are held. The elections 
are held on fixed dates set by the 1993 Russian constitution. Campaigning is 
restricted to a one month period prior to each election. Two television chan-
nels played significant roles in the elections during the period under discus-
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sion. The first was the primarily state-owned ORT, which was, at the time, at 
least partially owned by the oligarch Boris Berezovsky. The second was the 
privately owned station NTV which was owned by Media-Most a conglomer-
ate belonging to Vladimir Gussinsky.
The Duma elections of 1995 and the presidential elections that took 
place in 1996 perhaps best exemplify the power relations that were at play in 
the Russian media. The television station NTV was a relative newcomer to 
the Russian television market. NTV was founded in 1993 by Gussinsky and 
originally leased airtime from another Russian station, Peterburg Kanal 5. 
By the 1995 elections NTV had pioneered a news program called Sevodnya 
that twenty-six percent of Russians believed to be the most objective cover-
age available to them (Oates & Roselle, 2000, p. 32). The channel had distin-
guished itself from the state-owned channels through its excellent coverage 
of the war in Chechnya. Clearly NTV was not overtly pro-Kremlin, or partic-
ularly in-line with the official state apparatus. It exercised its power in a way 
that seemed to produce a change in the policies of the Russian state. 
In 1996, however, NTV chose to exercise its now considerable me-
dia power in support of ailing Russian president Boris Yeltsin. During the 
1995 Duma campaign “NTV’s Sevodnya provided more balanced coverage” 
(Oates, 2006, p. 100). While their coverage was less biased “almost 35 per-
cent of the total Sevodnya coverage... was devoted to elections in Chechnya” 
(Oates, 2006, p. 102). Their main rival ORT “often avoided criticism of the 
government” and “tended to overlook the smaller parties advocating swifter 
reform, and frequently gave communists as well as nationalists negative 
coverage” (Oates, 2006, p. 100). In the 1996 presidential campaign, however, 
“NTV president Igor Malashenko openly joined Yeltsin’s presidential cam-
paign team” (Oates, 2006, p. 103). Oates (2006) further observed that “unlike 
the 1995 Duma elections, NTV’s Sevodnya offered relatively little to counter 
the positive and often misleading coverage of Yeltsin” (p. 105). This was par-
ticularly true in the election runoff in which Yeltsin faced communist leader 
Gennady Zyuganov. There are several theories regarding why NTV’s cover-
age changed so dramatically. Oates (2006) has proposed that it may have 
been related to the granting of a national broadcast license to NTV by Yeltsin 
following the 1996 election (p. 110). This type of repayment for services is 
not altogether uncommon in the Russian context but it does represent a very 
problematic development for Russian media.
The relatively balanced coverage on NTV returned following the presi-
dential runoff. This situation, however, did not last long. In 1999, Yeltsin was 
facing his lowest popularity ratings since assuming office. He was “rated just 
1.8 on a 10 point scale” and “more than two-thirds were prepared to sup-
port public demonstrations calling for his resignation” (White, McAllister & 
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Oates, 2002, p. 17). Months before the election Yeltsin did step down, ap-
pointing then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to the post of interim-president. 
Putin set about transforming the Russian media system. In the 1999 Duma 
race and the 2000 presidential elections ORT and RTR, a smaller national 
television network owned by the state, helped the established powers led by 
Putin to maintain their hold on power. In this campaign, however, NTV chose 
not to support Putin and the pro-Kremlin All Russia party. This should not 
be taken to mean that NTV was being completely unbiased in its approach to 
the elections. Vladimir Gussinsky, who owned the controlling share of NTV, 
instead of backing Putin, backed the influential mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luz-
kov, who was thought to be making a run for the presidency and his party, 
Fatherland-All Russia. Thus, NTV’s support can be understood as Gussinsky 
exercising his power with the hopes that he would later be able to gain more 
power and influence from an alliance with the office of the president. In a 
sense, Gussinsky simply bet on the wrong horse.
At least in part because of the extensive reach of ORT and RTR, which 
together had a greater reach than NTV, Putin was able to fight off Luzhkov’s 
bid for the presidency. This was done in large part by providing false infor-
mation to sources who then passed them on to ORT and RTR journalists. 
This black PR campaign against Luzhkov and his allies was for the most part 
successful, as they won only 68 of the Duma’s 450 seats. Once in power it 
did not take long for Putin to exercise his power over media, particularly the 
recalcitrant NTV. Putin began targeting the independent television station. 
By April of 2001, through the selective application of tax law and the calling 
in of federal loans, NTV has fallen in the hands of the state-owned oil and 
gas giant Gazprom (Koltsova, 2006, p. 202). The simple explanation for this 
chain of events was that while Gussinsky, through his media empire, had a 
great deal of power to shape public opinion, his power was miniscule when 
compared to the power of the State. The State was able to use legal and semi-
legal measures to reassert their control over the whole of the Russian media. 
With Gazprom in command of NTV the Russian authorities could be assured 
that the exercise of its power would be used in conjunction with the wishes of 
the state.
It is worth quickly examining the role of the entertainment portion of 
Russian television. There is, after all, a great deal of television content that 
is not television news. It is more difficult, in a sense, for a newscast to sub-
vert the official message that is being put forward by the State. Russians, 
however, have a long history of expressing their dissent through cultural 
productions. Examples of this from the Soviet Period include the works of 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, such as The Cancer Ward and A Day in the Life of 
Ivan Denisovich, and others such as the Mikhail Bulgakov masterpiece The 
Master and Margarita. If resistance to the Russian state’s official message 
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is to be found anywhere, it may be found in the creative works on televi-
sion. Unfortunately, this area does not seem to have been extensively studied 
and, as a result, there is little literature on the topic. There is enough, how-
ever, to suggest that, at least for the moment, resistance in television fiction 
is minimal. As Stephen Hutchings (2008) suggests in his analysis of the PR 
campaign surrounding Saint Petersburg’s tercentenary, many films are being 
produced that are intended to “promote a sense of unity of purpose across 
the diverse factions making up the modern nation-state” (p. 3). Hutchings 
(2008) suggests that Nikita Mikhalkov’s 1997 film The Barber of Siberia and 
Dzhanik Faiziyev’s 2008 film Turkish Gambit strongly support the desire 
to create an official Russian state mythology that ties together the imperial 
and Soviet periods. These works are overt efforts to create and support the 
meaning of Russian identity as it has been re-imagined since the collapse of 
communism.
At the moment, the Russian state is the only body with the ability to ex-
ercise enough power to shape the national discourse. They have seized con-
trol of the means of media production and are using them to further increase 
their ability to exert power. This may change as it did in Ukraine and Georgia 
but for the moment the state has complete control over the media. The Rus-
sian state’s monopoly of the exercise of power in television is complete. For 
the moment, the office of the president is able to shape all national discourse 
on television.
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